This paper develops a simple model of international trade with intermediation. We consider an economy with two islands and two types of agents, farmers and traders. Farmers can produce two goods, but in order to sell these goods in centralized (Walrasian) markets, they need to be matched with a trader, and this entails costly search. In the absence of search frictions, our model reduces to a standard Ricardian model of trade. We use this simple model to contrast the implications of changes in the integration of Walrasian markets, which allow traders from di¤erent islands to exchange their goods, and changes in the access to these Walrasian markets, which allow farmers to trade with traders from di¤erent islands. We …nd that intermediation always magni…es the gains from trade under the former type of integration, but leads to more nuanced welfare results under the latter, including the possibility of aggregate losses. These welfare losses may be circumvented, however, through policies that discriminate against foreign traders in a way that minimizes the margins charged by domestic traders.
Introduction
Intermediaries are the grease that allows the wheels of commerce to spin. 1 From small itinerant traders picking up co¤ee in rural Uganda to large Asian trading companies matching Western manufacturers with local suppliers of goods or services, intermediaries are instrumental in bringing to life the gains from international exchange. Yet, these intermediaries are rarely viewed as the unsung heroes of globalization. Instead, they are sometimes portrayed as villains that exploit producers in less developed countries and siphon all gains from trade away from these economies and towards developed countries. In the words of Rodrik (2004) , "the most direct bene…ciaries of increases in border prices tend to be traders and intermediaries, rather than farmers."More vividly, an Oxfam International report on the co¤ee industry states that "without roads or transport to local markets, without technical backup, credit, or information about prices, the vast majority of farmers are at the mercy of itinerant traders" (Oxfam, 2002) .
What does the theory of international trade have to tell us about the role of these intermediaries?
Unfortunately, very little. Neoclassical trade theory assumes the existence of centralized markets where homogeneous goods are exchanged at a common, market-clearing price. New trade theory emphasizes product di¤erentiation and monopolistic behavior within industries, but how supply meets demand is again not speci…ed in those models. The purpose of this paper is to develop a stylized but explicit model of intermediation in trade, and to use this model to shed light on the role of intermediaries in materializing the gains from international trade as well as in a¤ecting the distribution of these gains.
Our starting point is a simple Ricardian model with two geographically separated islands, North and South, and two homogeneous goods, co¤ee and sugar. Each island is populated by a continuum of farmers who must decide, at any point in time, whether to grow co¤ee or sugar. We depart from the standard Ricardian model in assuming that farmers do not have direct access to centralized (Walrasian) markets where goods can be costlessly exchanged. Instead, farmers need to resort to traders to conduct these transactions on their behalf. Farmers'trading opportunities arise randomly at a rate determined by the ratio of traders to farmers seeking trades on each island at any point in time. We refer to this ratio as the island's level of intermediation. The number of traders active on each island is itself endogenous and pinned down by a free-entry condition.
Unlike farmers, traders are assumed to have direct access to Walrasian markets where all trades occur at a common, market-clearing relative price. Nevertheless, the terms of exchange between farmers and traders di¤er from those in the centralized market, since traders exploit the lock-in e¤ect created by search frictions to charge a positive margin to farmers and thereby recoup the costs they incur when intermediating trade. We model the determination of prices in bilateral exchanges 1 Though it is not straightforward to quantify the importance of intermediaries in market economies, Feenstra, Hanson and Lin (2004) estimate that, during the 1990s, Hong Kong intermediated over …fty percent of the volume of China's exports to the rest of the world. The early work of Wallis and North (1986) suggests that the size of the private "transaction sector" was around 41% of U.S. GNP in 1970. More recently, Spulber (1996a) provides a conservative estimate indicating that intermediation activities account for about 25% of U.S. GDP. Such estimates are, of course, very sensitive to the de…nition of "intermediation activities."
as the outcome of a generalized Nash bargaining game between each farmer and the trader he or she is matched with.
Using this simple theoretical framework we revisit the consequences of economic integration when trade is intermediated. We let the two islands di¤er in their available production technologies to grow co¤ee and sugar, as well as in their "market institutions," which we model as exogenous characteristics of the traders populating the two islands. More speci…cally, we let Northern traders be more e¢ cient than Southern traders in intermediating trade, and we also allow the primitive bargaining power of Northern traders to be higher than that of Southern traders. For simplicity, we further let the Northern island be large relative to the Southern one, so that we can (for the most part) focus on the e¤ects of integration for the Southern island and ignore the feedback e¤ects that this may have on the rest of the world.
How does one think about economic integration in a world economy where trading opportunities are constrained by such market institutions? A …rst possibility is to consider the case in which the centralized market where traders exchange goods becomes global rather than local, while maintaining the assumption that farmers can only …nd trading opportunities with local traders.
Throughout the paper, we refer to this …rst type of integration-the integration of two initially isolated Walrasian markets-as W-integration. Our model, however, also allows for a di¤erent type of integration involving the internationalization of trading opportunities, so that traders worldwide are allowed to intermediate trade in either of the two islands. We refer to this second type of integration-the integration of two initially isolated matching markets-as M-integration. Broadly speaking, W-integration aims to shed light on the consequences of convergence in goods prices across countries in the presence of intermediaries, while M-integration seeks to capture the consequences of the entry of foreign intermediaries in local markets, regardless of whether such intermediaries are trading companies, banks, or multinational companies in practice.
The …rst type of integration is analogous to the one considered by standard trade models.
Since our economy features domestic distortions associated with the bilateral exchanges between farmers and traders, one might have anticipated the possibility of W-integration having ambiguous welfare e¤ects; see e.g., Bhagwati (1971) . Our …rst result demonstrates that this is not the case:
W-integration generates Pareto gains from trade, just as in the standard Ricardian model. This is true regardless of the parameters governing market institutions in the two islands. Rather than aggravating distortions, we show that the endogeneity of intermediation necessarily magni…es the aggregate gains from trade and reduces the margins charged by traders. The integration of Walrasian markets increases the level of intermediation in the South, which generates growth along the transition path towards the new steady state. Furthermore, under mild regularity conditions, this growth e¤ect is larger in economies with lower levels of intermediation under autarky, thereby leading to convergence across countries.
By contrast, our analysis of the e¤ects of M-integration produces much more nuanced results.
The relatively higher pro…tability of Northern traders (due to their lower intermediation costs and higher bargaining power) allows them to penetrate the Southern island and intermediate trade there. Such process of entry naturally leads to an increase in the level of intermediation in the South over and above the one brought about by W-integration. Nevertheless, the higher bargaining power of Northern traders now implies an ambiguous e¤ect of M-integration on intermediation margins. Accordingly, social welfare in South may go up or down following M-integration. When the (primitive) bargaining strength of traders is similar across islands and the costs of intermediation di¤er signi…cantly, then M-integration is necessarily associated with an increase in social welfare in South that is in excess of the aforementioned gains from W-integration. Intuitively, M-integration improves the technology of intermediation in South with no adverse distributional consequences.
Conversely, when the (primitive) bargaining power of traders is disproportionately large in the North and the costs of intermediation are similar across islands, then M-integration may decrease social welfare in South. The reduction in Southern welfare occurs when the primitive bargaining power of traders is large relative to certain parameters governing search frictions. In those situations, even though Southern farmers (and the South as a whole) would be better o¤ if farmers could collectively commit to refuse any trade with Northern traders, each individual Southern farmer has an incentive to deviate from this cooperative equilibrium and accept trades with Northern traders.
Importantly, this is true ex-post (once a trading opportunity with a Northern trader arises) as well as ex-ante (when a farmer decides whether to actively seek trades with Northern agents or not). The key behind this "prisoner's dilemma" situation and the implied possibility of aggregate losses from trade is the trading externality underlying the search friction in goods markets. In this environment, the bilateral negotiations between a trader and a farmer not only a¤ect the division of surplus among these two agents, but also a¤ect the entry of traders and thus the rate at which trading possibilities arise for farmers that have not yet found a match. However, farmers and traders only bargain after they have found a match and thus their negotiations fail to internalize this externality. We …nd that a necessary (though not su¢ cient) condition for there to be aggregate losses from M-integration in South is for the margins charged by Northern traders to be larger than those charged by Southern traders before M-integration.
At this point, it may appear that our model captures some of the concerns regarding intermediaries expressed by activists and exempli…ed in our Oxfam quote above. In particular, losses from trade seem to be associated with the "marginalization" of Southern producers (in the sense that they only …nd trading opportunities at a limited rate), and with the fact that Northern traders charge exceedingly high margins for intermediating trade. A few observations are however in order. First, and most obviously, our model only demonstrates the possibility of aggregate losses, and at the same time it illustrates that integration can be a powerful mechanism to lift economies with weak levels of intermediation out of poverty. Second, in our model, in situations in which M-integration reduces welfare in the South, it also reduces welfare in the world because, by free entry, the (large) North is una¤ected by M-integration. Hence, our model does not suggest that M-integration will amount to a transfer of surplus from the South to the North. 2 Third, our model 2 It is worth pointing out that this observation crucially relies on the fact that we are comparing convergent paths rather than steady states (c.f., Diamond, 1980) . In Section 5, we also brie ‡y discuss the case where South is no longer small compared to North. In this situation, M-integration tends to increase welfare in the North while reducing it in is perfectly consistent with the South bene…tting from M-integration while at the same time Northern traders'margins being higher than those charged by Southern traders before M-integration. In our model, we show that a su¢ cient statistic for welfare analysis is the margin charged by Southern (rather than Northern) traders before and after M-integration.
The previous observations have important consequences for the optimal design of policies as dictated by our model. For instance, although price controls in the form of ‡oor prices or caps on margins may help reduce the likelihood of M-integration being welfare-reducing, they can also hinder the gains of such integration in South whenever these price controls do not appropriately discriminate between Northern and Southern traders. To be more precise, e¢ ciency dictates that price controls be imposed only on Northern traders, though these controls should be designed in a way that minimizes the margins charged by Southern traders. We further show that taxing the entry of traders can achieve the same goal as price controls without requiring discrimination between the two types of traders, in line with WTO's national treatment principle. Of course, both price controls and entry taxes are informationally intensive. Setting them at the right level requires detailed knowledge of several parameters of the model, or at the very least, detailed knowledge of how changes in prices and taxes (on Northern traders) a¤ect Southern traders'margins, which may still be hard for a government to observe in practice. We …nally explore an alternative policy that allows the government to circumvent informational constraints. It consists in creating segmented matching markets and providing farmers with information about their existence. If Southern farmers can direct their search towards di¤erent types of traders, then we show that aggregate losses from Mintegration can no longer arise. The obvious drawback of this policy intervention is that in the context of a developing country, allowing producers to direct their search may be extremely costly as it may require investments in transportation or infrastructure, a cost from which the present analysis abstracts.
Our model of intermediation is admittedly stylized and does not aspire to capture the precise workings of any particular market. The search frictions in our model merely aim to re ‡ect, in a somewhat reduced-form way, the set of frictions that inhibit the ability of producers to costlessly place their goods in world markets, whether such frictions actually derive from time-consuming search, from incomplete information about quality or prices, or from working-capital needs. Nonetheless, readers insisting on a literal interpretation of our framework may …nd our model useful in analyzing the role of itinerant traders in certain agricultural markets in Africa. In Uganda, for instance, where co¤ee represents close to one quarter of total exports, 85% of Robusta co¤ee farmers sell to itinerant traders despite the existence of nearby centralized markets; see Fafchamps and Hill (2005) . This phenomenon has been deemed important for understanding how the welfare gains associated with terms-of-trade improvements are distributed between farmers and intermediaries (see Fafchamps and Hill, 2008) . Furthermore, there is evidence that trading externalities of the type formalized by our model may be key in the determination of the welfare implications of these the South. The mechanism at play, however, is a standard general equilibrium terms-of-trade e¤ect. By improving the intermediation technology in the South, M-integration increases the relative supply of Southern goods, and in turn, worsens its terms of trade.
terms-of-trade movements (see Fafchamps and Hill, 2008). 3 Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, we draw some ideas from a small literature that has studied the emergence and characteristics of intermediaries in closed-economy (and mostly partial-equilibrium) models. Important early contributions to this literature include the work of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) , Biglaiser (1993), and Spulber (1996b) . As in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) , we also emphasize the importance of search frictions in determining the margins charged by intermediaries, though we do so in a general equilibrium, open-economy setup. 4 In terms of the structure of our model, we borrow some tools from the sizeable literature on search-theoretic approaches to the analysis of labor markets, which builds on the seminal paper by Diamond (1982) and the in ‡uential work of Mortensen and Pissarides (2004) . 5 In that respect, the ine¢ ciency underlying our non-standard welfare results bears a close relationship to Hosios' (1990a) analysis of the e¢ ciency of labor market equilibria. 6 Search-theoretic models have been applied to the study of international trade issues before, but with very di¤erent goals in mind.
For instance, Davidson et al. (1988 Davidson et al. ( , 1999 and Hosios (1990b) study the workings of two-sector, general equilibrium models featuring asymmetric search frictions in the two sectors, and revisit the determination of comparative advantage and the e¤ects of trade integration on labor market outcomes (see also Costinot, 2009, and Helpman et al., 2009) . Instead, in our model, search frictions are symmetric in the two sectors.
In terms of focus, our paper is more closely related to a recent, burgeoning literature on the role of intermediaries in world trade. On the empirical side, this literature builds on the insights of Rauch (2001) , Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) , and Feenstra and Hanson (2004) about the importance of intermediation and networks in determining the e¤ective costs of conducting international trade across countries. 7 More recent approaches have used …rm-level data to shed further light on the factors that drive a …rm to seek the help of an intermediary when engaging in international trade (see, for instance, Ahn et al., 2009, and Blum et al., 2009) .
While some of these contributions o¤er simple models to motivate the empirical analysis, the modeling of intermediaries tends to focus on technological di¤erences across …rms and on their implications for cross-sectional predictions (at the …rm-or industry-level). Instead, we develop a general equilibrium model where the rationale for intermediaries and the margins they charge 3 In this context, one can also think of the signi…cant presence of foreign …rms in co¤ee production in Uganda as a real-world counterpart to M-integration in our model. For example, the Kaweri co¤ee plantation, which is Uganda's largest co¤ee farm, is owned by the Neumann Ka¤ee Gruppe based in Hamburg, Germany. 4 This aspect of our analysis also is related to the work of Du¢ e et al. (2005) who study how the bid and ask prices charged by marketmakers in over-the-counter markets are shaped by search frictions.
5 See Pissarides (2000) for an overview of the early contributions to this literature and Rogerson et al. (2005) for an account of more recent developments. 6 Our results about optimal policy in economies where trade is intermediated also echo some earlier results on the e¤ects of minimum wages in the labor literature; see e.g. Flinn (2006) . 7 Morriset (1998) studies the role of intermediaries margins in shaping the gap between the retail price of seven major commodities and the price obtained by the producers of these commodities. McMillan et al. (2003) also argue that these intermediation margins are important for understanding the small recorded welfare gains from trade liberalization of the cashew sector in Mozambique. Hummels et al. (2009) o¤er evidence of price discrimination in the shipping industry. See Stahl (1988) for an early, simple model of market power in international trading. stems from search frictions. By explicitly modeling market institutions we are able to draw welfare implications for the e¤ects of integration in a world in which middlemen intermediate trade, and we are also able to discuss the optimal design of policies within our framework. In that respect, our work is most closely related to the earlier work of Rauch and Watson (2004) and recent working papers by Bardhan et al. (2009) and Chau et al. (2009) , who develop complementary theories of intermediation. Our work is however distinct in three key dimensions. First, our model is built as a strict generalization of a standard Ricardian model of trade: when intermediation costs go to zero, traders'margins vanish, and the equilibrium is analogous to that of the standard model. Second, we develop a dynamic framework where traders'margins are shaped by both the current and future trading opportunities of farmers. Finally, we depart from these previous authors in studying the welfare consequences of two distinct types of economic integration. 8 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic environment. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium under autarky. Section 4 and 5 analyze the consequences of Walrasian and matching market integration, respectively. Section 6 discusses policy implications.
Section 7 o¤ers some concluding remarks. All proofs can be found in the appendix.
The Basic Environment
Consider an island inhabited by a continuum of in…nitely lived agents consuming two goods, co¤ee (C) and sugar (S). An exogenous measure N F of the island inhabitants are engaged in production.
We refer to this set of agents as farmers and assume that they (and only they) have access to production technologies that allow them to produce an amount 1=a C of co¤ee or an amount 1=a S of sugar per unit of time. A farmer cannot produce both goods at the same date t and goods are not storable. We denote by 2 [0; 1] the share of co¤ee farmers at a given date. For notational convenience, we drop time indices from all our variables whenever there is no risk of confusion.
Our main point of departure from the classical Ricardian model is that farmers do not have direct access to Walrasian markets where their output can be exchanged for that of other farmers. In order to be able to sell part of their output and consume both goods, a farmer needs to …nd a trader, and doing so may take time as described below. Traders do not spend any time engaged in production but have access to Walrasian markets in which both goods are exchanged competitively. We denote by p p C =p S the relative price of co¤ee in this Walrasian market. Somewhat allegorically, we envision a situation in which, at each date, traders (and only they) are informed about the location on the island where trade can take place. 9
The pool of potential traders on the island is large. At any point in time, potential traders can become active or inactive. In order to remain connected to Walrasian markets, an active trader must incur an intermediation cost equal to at each date, but stands to obtain some remuneration when intermediating a trade for a farmer. By contrast, inactive traders are involved in an activity that generates no income but also no disutility of e¤ort, e.g., laying in a hammock. We assume that the pool of potential traders is large enough to ensure that the measure of traders operating on the island, N T , is not constrained by population size and some agents are always laying in hammocks.
Hence, in equilibrium, N T will be endogenously pinned down by free entry.
All agents aim to maximize the expected value of their lifetime utility 10
where r > 0 is the common discount factor; I A (t) = 1 if the agent is an active trader at date t and I A (t) = 0 otherwise; C (t) 0 and S (t) 0 are the consumption of good C and S at date t, respectively; and v is increasing, concave, homogeneous of degree one and satis…es the two Inada conditions:
The assumption that the utility function v is homogeneous of degree one guarantees that agents are risk neutral. Combined with the Inada conditions, it also implies that both goods are essential:
The process through which farmers …nd traders involves search frictions. Farmers and traders can be in two states, matched (M ) or unmatched (U ). We denote by u F and u T the mass of unmatched farmers and traders at any point in time. Unmatched farmers and traders come together randomly. The number of matches per unit of time is given by a matching function, m (u F ; u T ), which is increasing, concave, homogeneous of degree one and satis…es the two In-
The associated (Poisson) rate at which unmatched farmers meet unmatched traders is equal to F ( ) m (1; ), with u T =u F . Similarly, the rate at which unmatched traders meet unmatched farmers is given by T ( ) m (1= ; 1) = F ( ) = . The variable is a su¢ cient statistic for the matching rates of both agents, which we refer to as the level of "intermediation" on the island. We also assume that existing matches are destroyed at an exogenous Poisson rate > 0.
When a farmer and a trader form a match, they negotiate the terms of exchange of the output in the hands of the farmer. Although the trader has access to a Walrasian market where co¤ee and sugar are exchanged at a relative price p, the bilateral terms of trade will depart from this competitive price and will re ‡ect the (primitive) bargaining power of agents as well as their outside options. Rather than explicitly modeling these negotiations through an extensive form game, we simply posit that generalized Nash bargaining leaves traders with a fraction of the ex-post gains from trade (with the latter naturally depending on outside opportunities). Both parties observe the type of good that the farmer carries, so bargaining occurs under complete information. Let
denote the value function of a farmer matched with a trader and producing good i = C; S; and let V U F denote the value function of an unmatched farmer. 11 Similarly, let V M T i denote the value 1 0 We model traders as economic agents with preferences represented by the utility function V . The equilibrium would be essentially identical if we were to model traders as pro…t-maximizing …rms.
1 1 Given that both goods are essential in consumption, it is clearly the case that unmatched farmers will attain the function of a trader matched with a farmer carrying good i; and V U T denote the value function of an unmatched trader. Formally, the Nash bargaining consumption levels of a farmer-trader match
where I C = 1 if the farmer carries co¤ee and I C = 0, otherwise. As we shall see, the implicit bilateral relative price at which goods are exchanged can easily be retrieved from these consumption levels.
Each date t is divided into three periods. First, farmers decide which goods to produce. Second, matched farmers and traders bargain over the exchange of goods. Finally, matched traders carry out transactions in Walrasian markets, consumption takes place, new matches are formed among unmatched agents, and a fraction of existing matches is dissolved exogenously.
3 Autarky Equilibrium
De…nition
We de…ne the equilibrium at any point in time of an isolated island of the type described above as: 
Equilibrium Conditions
In order to understand the occupational choice decisions of agents, we need to describe how expected
for i = C; S, are determined. These value functions must satisfy the following Bellman equations:
Equations (1) and (2) re ‡ect the fact that unmatched farmers get zero instantaneous utility and become matched at rate F ( ) (at which point they obtain a gain of max
whereas matched farmers with good i get utility v(C F i ; S F i ) and become unmatched at rate (at same welfare level when unemployed, independently of the good they produce. For notational convenience, we thus simply write V
which point they incur a loss of V M
. Both equations incorporate a potential capital gain or loss of remaining in the farmer's current state (
). Equations (3) and (4) are derived similarly and follow from the fact that unmatched traders are subject to an intermediation cost and get matched to a co¤ee farmer with probability T ( ) and to a sugar farmer with probability
(1 ) T ( ), whereas traders matched with a farmer carrying good i = C; S get instantaneous utility v(C T i ; S T i ) and become unmatched at rate .
We can now describe how the process of intermediation and Nash bargaining between farmers and traders a¤ect the division of surplus and the implied terms of exchange of goods C and S. As we formally show in the Appendix, Nash bargaining between farmers and traders implies that, at any point in time,
as well as
and
where
denote the joint consumption of co¤ee and sugar by each farmer-trader match producing good i = C; S, respectively. Equation (5) simply states that traders get a share of the surplus of any match, while equations (6) and (7) re ‡ect the fact that Nash bargaining outcomes are Pareto e¢ cient.
Equilibrium in the island also requires that the Walrasian markets for co¤ee and sugar clear at any point in time. This in turn requires that
These two equations simply equate average consumption of each good by each matched pair to the average production of this good among matched pairs participating in the Walrasian market.
Note that Walras' law still holds in this environment: because of Equation (7), one of the two market-clearing conditions is redundant.
The last set of equilibrium conditions relate to the evolution of the measure of matched and unmatched farmers and traders in the island. Free entry into the trading activity ensures that the expected utility of an unmatched trader exactly equals the expected utility of an inactive trader at all points in time, that is,
Finally, matching frictions imply that the measure of unmatched farmers u F evolves according to the following law of motion:
The …rst term in the right-hand-side corresponds the measure of farmers entering the unmatched state through exogenous separations, while the second term is the measure of farmers …nding a match at a given point in time. The overall measure of active traders can then be determined by the fact that the measure of matched traders must be equal to the measure of matched farmers at any point in time:
3.3 Characterization, Existence, and Uniqueness
We next brie ‡y characterize some key features the autarkic equilibrium and outline a proof of its existence and uniqueness, with most technical details being relegated to the Appendix.
Because farmers are free to choose which good to produce at any point in time, it must be the
V M F at all times if both goods are produced in the autarkic equilibrium, which is ensured by our Inada conditions. Equation
at all times. Combining this observation with equations (2) and (6), we obtain (
In words, farmers should attain the same utility level when matched regardless of which good they carry, which in turn implies that traders are also indi¤erent as to the type of farmer that they get matched with.
Armed with the previous equilibrium conditions, it is easy to characterize the relative price, p, the share of co¤ee farmers, , and the total consumption among matched pairs, C C C = C S and S S C = S S , which are all determined in the Walrasian market. Since consumption levels are identical for both types of farmer-trader match, equation (7) implies that the only relative price p of co¤ee consistent with equilibrium is
Note that p is time-invariant and identical to the relative price that would apply in a frictionless
Ricardian model in which farmers had direct access to Walrasian markets. Intuitively, search frictions create a wedge between competitive prices and those prevailing in bilateral exchanges and thus a¤ect the distribution of income between farmers and traders, but these frictions have a symmetric e¤ect on both sectors, and thus do not distort the relative supply or demand for co¤ee or sugar. Similarly, because farmers and traders have identical homothetic preferences, equations (6), (8), and (9) imply that the share of farmers producing co¤ee is also time invariant and una¤ected by search frictions, and is given by
1 is the relative demand for co¤ee. Combining this expression with (8), and (9), we can obtain the total consumption of co¤ee and sugar among matched pairs:
The joint instantaneous utility enjoyed by a matched farmer-trader pair is thus given by v C; S and is time invariant. Because the function v ( ) is homogeneous of degree one, it is also necessarily the case that v ( ) is proportional to the value of the farmer's good in the Walrasian market (i.e., the joint spending of the matched pair). In the rest of the paper, we slightly abuse notation and denote by v (p) v C; S the joint utility level (net of e¤ort costs) of a matched farmer-trader pair when the relative price of co¤ee is equal to p.
We next turn to a discussion of the terms of trade in bilateral exchanges, which is at the heart of our analysis. Throughout the paper, we will denote by 2 (0; 1) the share of joint consumption C and S that is captured by the trader, with the remaining share 1 accruing to the farmer.
Equation (6) ensures that this share is common for both goods. Naturally, a higher is associated with a distribution of surplus that is more favorable to the trader. As shown in the Appendix,
equations (1)- (5) imply that at all points in time in the autarky equilibrium, the share is given
Not surprisingly, the previous expression states that the share of goods captured by the trader is decreasing in the ratio of unmatched traders to unmatched farmers. Straightforward manipulation of equation (17) also demonstrates that, for a given value of , is necessarily increasing in the primitive bargaining power .
The value of can be interpreted as the "traders'margins", that is, the (percentage) di¤erence between the world relative price, p, and the e¤ective relative price at which a farmer sells his or her good to a trader, p bid . To see this formally, note that the instantaneous utility function v is homogenous of degree 1. Thus the farmer obtains an instantaneous utility level equal to
(1 ) v (p), and his or her consumption choices are as if the farmer's income -and thus the price at which the trader buys co¤ee -had been reduced by a factor 1 . We can hence conclude that the traders'(percentage) margin is equal to p p bid p = > 0. So without risk of confusion, we will simply refer to as the traders'margins.
Having discussed the determination of prices in our model, we next move to characterizing the dynamics of the level of intermediation, the value functions, and the measures of matched and unmatched traders and farmers on the island. Using equation (3), we can rearrange the free entry condition, equation (10), as
Equation (18) simply states that the present discounted utility of a matched trader should be equal to the present discounted utility cost of remaining active while searching for a match. It implicitly de…nes the level of intermediation as an increasing function of the value function
. In order to characterize the dynamics of the level of intermediation, we can therefore focus on the dynamics of V M T . Combining the Bellman equation of matched traders (4) with the free entry condition (10) and the Nash bargaining outcome (17), we obtain
Since we know that^ 0 V M T > 0 by (18), we can conclude that the dynamics of V M T in (19) are unstable. The only rational expectations equilibrium is thus one in which _ V M T = 0, which further implies _ = _ = 0. Using the fact that _ V M T = 0 with equations (18) and (19), the equilibrium level of intermediation can then be expressed, at any point in time, as the implicit solution of
Note that the right-hand side is an increasing function of . Thus intermediation is higher in economies with higher surplus levels v (p), lower intermediation costs , and higher primitive bargaining power of traders, . When the cost of intermediation goes to 0, the level of implicit in equation (20) goes to +1 and goes to 0, hence implying that farmers capture all the surplus, just as in the Ricardian model.
Because is time-invariant, V U F and V M F now are the solution of a linear system of ODE, equations (1) and (2). Since the eigenvalues of that system are both strictly positive, we must also
In other words, all value functions must immediately jump to their steady state values and remain constant thereafter. Combining equations (1), (2), (17), and (20) we obtain at any point in time
By contrast, the dynamics of u F in equation (11) are globally stable and u F slowly converges to its steady state value given by
Once the dynamics of u F is known, the dynamics of u T and N T can be computed using the de…nition of = u T =u F and equation (12). Since is a "jump"variable, both u T and N T must jump as well in order to ensure that equation (20) holds at any point in time. In the steady-state, we have
As shown in the Appendix, the right-hand-side of this last equation is increasing in and hence, the steady-state measure of traders N T is higher in economies with better production technologies, lower intermediation costs and higher bargaining power of traders.
The previous discussion has demonstrated, by construction, the existence and uniqueness of an autarkic equilibrium. It has also characterized some of its key features, as summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 An autarkic equilibrium exists and is unique. The relative price of co¤ ee, p, the share of co¤ ee farmers, , the vector of consumption levels, (C F ; S F ; C T ; S T ), and the level of intermediation, , are constant over time and determined by equations (13)- (17) and (20). Similarly, the lifetime utilities of all agents are time-invariant and given by equations (10), (18), (21), and 
Integration of Walrasian Markets

Assumptions
In the rest of this paper, we assume that the island described in section 2, which we now refer to as "South", opens up to trade with another island, which we call "North". As in a standard Ricardian model, the two islands di¤er in the production technologies these farmers have access to.
To …x ideas, we assume that South has a comparative advantage in co¤ee, so that a C =a S < a C =a S , where asterisks denote variables related to the Northern island. In addition to these technological di¤erences, we allow the Southern and the Northern island to di¤er in terms of their "market institutions" by which we mean: (i) their intermediation costs, and ; and (ii) the primitive bargaining power of their traders, and . Finally, we assume that the number of Southern farmers, N F , is (in…nitely) small compared to the number of Northern farmers, N F . Thus the Southern island can be viewed as a small open economy.
Throughout this section, we focus on a situation in which farmers are only able to meet traders from their own island, as in section 2, but traders from both islands now have access to a common Walrasian market (located, at each date, in one of many possible desert islands). This is the situation which we refer to as W-integration. Our goal is to analyze how (unexpected) W-integration a¤ects the levels of intermediation, production, and welfare in the Southern island. 12
Equilibrium Conditions
Since the Northern island is large compared to the Southern island, the relative price of co¤ee under W-integration, p W , must be equal to the Northern autarky relative price:
By assumption, we know that p W = a C =a S > a C =a S . Hence Southern traders are able to exchange co¤ee at a higher relative price under W-integration than under autarky. The income of matched farmer-trader pairs is therefore strictly higher if they produce co¤ee rather than sugar; see equation
. As a result, all Southern farmers will immediately specialize in co¤ee production, which will raise the indirect utility all matched farmer-trader pairs from
The mechanism is the same as in a standard Ricardian model. 13 Since Southern farmers can only match with traders from their own island, we can use the same argument as in section 3 to show that the traders'margins, W , and the level of intermediation, W , will immediately jump to their new steady state values given by:
Equations ( 
Intermediation, Growth, and Distributional Consequences
According to equations (20) and (27), the jump in utility levels caused by W-integration will be associated with a jump in the level of intermediation triggered by the instantaneous entry of new traders. Quite intuitively, by free entry, an increase in the gains from trade must be accompanied by an expansion of the trading activity in the Southern island. As we now demonstrate, this new e¤ect has important implications for both growth and the distribution of the gains from trade in that island.
First, the instantaneous increase in will slowly increase the number of matched farmers in 1 3 Recall that by equations (6) and (7), C; S maximizes v (C; S) subject to pC + S (p=aC ). Thus an increase in p from aC =aS to a C =a S necessarily expands the "budget set" of a farmer-trader match specialized in co¤ee.
1 4 It is worth pointing out that the simple dynamics after W-integration hinge heavily on the fact that the Northern island is large compared to the Southern island. If North was su¢ ciently small to start specializing in sugar, the relative price of co¤ee and the levels of intermediation would now depend on one another: a high price of co¤ee would lead to more entry in the Southern island, which would increase the world relative supply of co¤ee, and in turn, decrease its price. Hence, p W , , and would slowly (and interdependently) vary over time. As we later discuss, our main results about the welfare consequences of W-integration would, however, remain unchanged. the economy, as illustrated by equation (11). Starting from the autarky equilibrium, W-integration therefore leads to GDP growth along the transition path towards the new steady state equilibrium. 15 The magnitude of this "growth e¤ect" depends on the initial level of intermediation as well as the properties of the matching technology. If the matching elasticity "
in the level of intermediation, then ceteris paribus, islands with lower levels of intermediation always grow faster after W-integration (see Appendix). 16 In this situation, trade integration tends to lead to convergence across countries.
Second, the endogenous increase in the level of intermediation due to W-integration has distributional consequences. Combining equations (26) and (27), we get
where the bracket term is decreasing in W . Thus the instantaneous entry of new traders reduces W , and this implies an instantaneous improvement of the farmers' terms of trade and an instantaneous worsening of the traders'terms of trade.
Welfare Consequences
Changes in the level of intermediation caused by W-integration also have interesting welfare con- It is intuitively clear why the increased matching rate and enhanced bargaining power associated with W-integration will bene…t farmers. Furthermore, by free entry, it is obvious that unmatched traders are una¤ected by W-integration. The free entry condition is also important for understanding why matched traders will bene…t from W-integration despite the decrease in their margins.
The key is that because W-integration increases intermediation and reduces the probability with which traders …nd matches, free entry dictates that the welfare level they must attain when being matched has to be higher. Hence, matched traders also bene…t from W-integration.
What happens to social welfare? The fact that all agents are (weakly) better o¤ implies, a fortiori, that social welfare goes up with W-integration. We can, however, make sharper predictions.
For the sake of clarity, let us reintroduce time indices explicitly. At any date t before W-integration, 1 5 Although trade integration causes growth in our model, the import penetration ratio remains constant along the transition path as the number of matched traders a¤ect proportionally Southern GDP and Southern imports. there are N F u F (t) matched pairs attaining a joint expected lifetime utility V M F (t) + V M T (t), a measure u F (t) of farmers obtaining V U F (t), and a measure u T (t) of unmatched traders with zero expected lifetime utility. Social welfare W (t) is therefore equal to
where u F (t) is predetermined at date t, but V U F (t), V M F (t), and V M T (t) are jump variables. By the Bellman equations (2) and (4) and the free entry condition (10), we also know that
Thus we can rearrange the social welfare function as
Since u F (t) is predetermined at date t, equation (29) implies that in order to compute the changes in W (t) associated with W-integration, we can focus on changes in the two jump variables,
. Using equations (20) and (21) into equation (29), we can express social welfare in the South before W-integration as:
As explained above, W-integration raises the surplus from trading, as captured by the utility term
. This is the standard welfare gain highlighted by neoclassical models of trade. Notice, however, that (t) is increasing in the level of intermediation (t) and hence it also increases following W-integration. We can then conclude that, compared to a situation with an exogenous level of intermediation, the integration of Walrasian markets leads to a higher (percentage) increase in social welfare. We refer to this result as the "magni…cation e¤ect"of intermediation. This is, of course, the welfare counterpart of the growth e¤ect discussed in the previous section. 17
Proposition 2 summarizes our …ndings about the e¤ects of W-integration.
Proposition 2 W-integration: (i) induces growth along the transition path and, if the matching elasticity " is nonincreasing in the level of intermediation, leads to convergence across islands; (ii)
improves the farmers' terms of trade and worsens the traders' terms of trade; and (iii) makes all agents (weakly) better o¤ . 
Integration of Matching Markets
Assumptions
So far we have assumed that traders can only meet farmers from their own island. We now turn to a situation in which traders are (unexpectedly) allowed to search for farmers in both islands (though they can only search for farmers in one of these two islands at any point in time). We refer to this process as matching market integration, or simply M-integration, and we show below that the welfare implications of this type of integration are much more nuanced. In order to better illustrate our results, we assume that W-integration has already happened and that Northern and Southern traders have access to a common (integrated) Walrasian market where co¤ee is exchanged at a relative price p W = a C =a S . 18
As before, we continue to assume that islands di¤er in their intermediation costs and in the primitive bargaining power of traders. In order to avoid a taxonomic exercise, we assume throughout that Northern traders have a better intermediation technology, that is > , and that Northern agents, regardless of whether they are farmers or traders, tend to have high primitive bargaining power relative to Southern agents. In particular, when Northern traders bargain with Southern farmers, they obtain a share of the ex-post gains from trade that is higher than that obtained by Southern traders bargaining with these same Southern farmers, that is > . 19
Throughout this paper, we do not take a stance on the precise source of asymmetry of bargaining power. The large literature emanating from the seminal work of Rubinstein (1982) , has uncovered several potential determinants of primitive bargaining power. It is well-known, for instance, that relatively impatient or risk averse agents will tend to have relatively low bargaining power, and the same will be true about agents for which a bargaining delay might be particularly costly for reasons other than impatience, such as credit constraints. 20 For these reasons, we …nd it natural to focus on the case in which, if cross-country bargaining power asymmetries exist, they are associated with
Northern agents being relatively more powerful negotiators.
Before proceeding to our analysis of the consequences of M-integration, we also need to specify 1 8 The fact that the relative price p W is common across countries is not important for the results below. 1 9 Similarly, Southern traders that bargain with Northern farmers obtain a share of the ex-post gains from trade that is lower than that obtained by Northern traders bargaining with these same Northern farmers, that is < . We shall brie ‡y show, however, that Southern traders will never intermediate trade in the North in equilibrium.
2 0 See, for instance, Rubinstein (1982) , Roth (1985) , and Roth and Rothblum (1982) . Muthoo's (1999) textbook provides a useful survey of bargaining theory.
how matching between agents from di¤erent islands takes place. Consistently with our closedeconomy setup, we assume that if Northern and Southern traders both operate in the same island, then they have the same probability of being matched with farmers from that island. In other words, matching remains random. Farmers cannot direct their search towards one particular type of traders. This assumption aims to capture a situation in which farmers have no information about where traders are located in the island. Thus they simply stay in their farms and wait for traders to show up (or not). We will come back to this assumption in more detail in section 6.
Finally, note that the heterogeneity between traders from the two islands forces us to consider the endogenous destruction of matches. For instance, if Northern traders are much more e¢ cient than Southern traders, it is possible for the joint surplus of a matched pair consisting of a Southern trader and a Southern farmer to be lower than the new (post M-integration) outside opportunity of the matched farmer (which is his or her value when being unmatched). In those circumstances, "allSouthern" partnerships should e¢ ciently dissolve. In order to introduce this possibility formally, we assume that after matches are created, but before bargaining takes place, farmers choose the probability i 2 [0; 1] with which they break their matches with traders from island i.
Equilibrium Conditions
We …rst study how M-integration a¤ects the mix of traders operating in each island. Relative to the Northern traders searching in a given island, Southern traders searching in the same island incur a higher intermediation cost per period and, when …nding a match, they have relatively lower bargaining power. Since the surplus being generated by a match with a Northern trader is higher, v p W > v p W , farmers are also more likely to stay in a match that involves a Northern trader than to keep searching for another type of trader, N S . Putting all the previous pieces together, we have that Northern traders will necessarily be more pro…table (i.e., attain higher welfare levels) than Southern traders under random matching; see Appendix for details. Appealing to free entry, we can then conclude:
Lemma 1 If M-integration occurs at some unexpected date t 0 , then with probability one, new matches only involve Northern traders in both islands for all t > t 0 .
It is important to emphasize that the previous result does not necessarily imply that Mintegration instantly wipes out all Southern traders from the world economy. When M-integration occurs, we know that there is a positive measure of matched pairs composed of a Southern trader and a Souther farmer. As argued above, as long as the joint value of this pair exceeds the new value of an unmatched farmer, these pairs will not dissolve. Whether this condition holds depends on the features of the new equilibrium, which we now describe.
Since the relative price of co¤ee must remain …xed at the Northern autarky level, the joint consumption that a trader and a farmer can attain by forming a match in either of the two islands (i.e., v(p W ) and v (p W )) will not be a¤ected by M-integration and will feature no dynamics. Fur- 
T N , and V M T S the expected lifetime utilities of these six types of agents. Using Lemma 1 and the fact that all Southern farmers specialize in co¤ee production, we can then express the Bellman equations of these agents as follows:
where N denotes the level of intermediation in the Southern island after M-integration, and N and S denote the margins of Northern and Southern traders, respectively. In addition, at all points in time, free entry by Northern traders will necessarily imply that
Combining the previous expression with equations (30)-(33) and our Nash bargaining conditions, it is easy to verify that the Northern traders' margins, N , and the level of intermediation after M-integration, N , will immediately satisfy
These two expressions are just the counterpart of Equations (26) and (27) with < and > . Combining equations (34) and (35) with our Nash bargaining conditions, we can also show (see proof of Lemma 1 for details) that the margins of Southern traders must also immediately jump to 
Finally, note that equations (41) and (42) imply that v p W rV U F is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for existing Southern matches to survive after M-integration. Using equations (36), (37) and (39), we can simplify this condition to v p W 1 N , where N is implicitly determined by equation (37). For a given value of N , the previous inequality states that existing Southern matches are more likely to survive if the surplus generated by a match is high, i.e., if v p W is high or is low.
Intermediation, Growth, and Distributional Consequences
Since > and < , equations (27) and (37) imply that M-integration necessarily increases the level of intermediation in South: N > W . Intuitively, though the entry of Northern traders wipes out all unmatched Southern traders, these Northern traders bring a better intermediation technology and have a higher bargaining power, so it is not surprising that their entry exceeds that of Southern traders prior to M-integration. 22 Like in section 4, this instantaneous increase 2 1 Like in section 4, the absence of dynamics in intermediation levels and traders'margins hinges on the fact that North is large compared to South, which pins down the relative price of co¤ee in the Walrasian markets.
2 2 If both Northern and Southern farmers were completely specialized in the production of sugar and co¤ee, respectively, the same prediction would hold at any point in time (in spite of the dynamics in the relative price of co¤ee).
in the level of intermediation will increase the number of matched farmers in the South, thereby generating growth along the transition path. Furthermore, for the same reasons as in section 4, if the matching elasticity "
is nonincreasing in the level of intermediation, output in islands with lower levels of intermediation will tend to grow faster after M-integration.
We can next study how M-integration a¤ects the share of the surplus that farmers are able to capture when matched with a trader. Here we have to distinguish between the cases in which the farmer is matched with a Northern trader and in which he or she continues to be matched with the same Southern trader as before M-integration. Let us consider the former case …rst. Equation (38), which tends to worsen Southern farmers'outside option and improve the Southern traders'terms of trade. As we demonstrate in the next section, whether S is higher or lower than W will be closely related to changes in social welfare and the so-called Hosios (1990a) condition in the search-theoretical literature. 23 In addition, changes in the level of intermediation in the South would lead to an improvement in the Northern terms of trade, i.e. a decrease in the relative price of co¤ee, which would also raise the level of intermediation in the North. 2 3 It is worth pointing out that, in general, one cannot rank the relative magnitude of the bargaining shares of Northern and Southern traders, N and S . Given that the primitive bargaining power of Northern traders is higher than that of Southern traders, it would seem intuitive that N > S . Yet, the ranking of intermediation costs, < , implies that the ex-post gains from trade are lower in the "all-Southern" pairs. Thus conditional on the same outside option, V U F , Southern farmers tend to obtain a lower payo¤ when matched with Southern traders, which tends to make S greater than N . Which of the two e¤ects dominates again depends on the relative magnitude of the variation in primitive bargaining power, and , and intermediation costs, and . According to equations (36) and (38), if traders from both islands only di¤er in their primitive bargaining power, = , then we should observe that N > S . By contrast, if their di¤erences only come from their intermediation technology, = , then we should have N < S .
Welfare Consequences
Our previous discussion hints at the fact that the welfare implications of M-integration are likely to be distinct from those of W-integration. Our …rst result in that respect is that, unlike in the case of W-integration, M-integration always creates winners and losers, and thus distributional con ‡icts. In particular, the e¤ect on Southern traders'welfare is always of the opposite sign to that on Southern farmers, no matter whether the latter are matched or not at the time of M-integration.
To see this, note that equations (41) and (42), together with Nash bargaining, imply
Among existing matches, the intermediation technology, , the primitive bargaining power of the trader, , and the utility level, v p W are una¤ected by M-integration. Therefore, we can conclude that if unmatched Southern farmers win from M-integration, V U F > 0, matched Southern traders must lose, V M T S < 0. The converse is obviously true as well: if unmatched Southern farmers lose, Southern traders must win. By equation (42), this result implies that there is a negative relationship between movements in V U F and movements in S . Armed with this observation, inspection of equation (41) then reveals that the welfare e¤ect on matched farmers is always of the same sign as that of unmatched farmers. For instance, when V U F goes up, S goes down, and V M F S in (41) must necessarily go up. The intuition is simple. Among existing matches, M-integration only a¤ects the outside option of Southern farmers, with the latter being equal to the value of unmatched Southern farmers. When this outside option goes up (i.e., S goes down), existing pairs redistribute surplus from traders to farmers, while the converse is true when this outside option goes down. The likelihood of each of these two scenarios will be studied in more detail below. 24 Up to this point, we have shown that there cannot be any Pareto gains or losses from Mintegration. 25 This leaves open, however, the possibility of aggregate losses from trade in the Southern island. In order to investigate this question formally, let us come back to the social welfare function introduced in section 4.4. At any date t before M-integration and after W-integration, we know that
Since v p W is not a¤ected by M-integration and u F (t) is predetermined at date t, the previous expression implies that changes in social welfare caused by M-integration, W , must re ‡ect changes 2 4 In the previous discussion, we implicitly assumed that existing Southern matches were not destroyed after Mintegration. If this were to happen, then we would have
(r + ) < 0, which requires V U F goes up. In this case, unmatched and matched Southern farmers are again better o¤, whereas Southern traders are worse o¤.
2 5 Comparing convergent paths rather than steady states is important for deriving this result. If Southern traders win from M-integration, then in the new steady state, the only winners from M-integration have disappeared, and we would erroneously conclude that M-integration generates Pareto losses.
in the expected lifetime utility of unmatched farmers, V U F . Given our earlier discussion of the relationship between V U F , V M T S , and S , this further implies the Southern traders'terms of trade, S , is a su¢ cient statistic for welfare analysis in the South. 26 In particular, there will be aggregate losses from M-integration in the South, W < 0, if and only if S > W . This observation will play an important role in the design of optimal policy. It suggests that governments aiming to maximize social welfare can use the (observable) response of S as a useful guide to policy, with welfare attaining its maximum when S attains its minimum. We come back to this issue in the next section.
Using equations (36), (37), and (39) as well as their counterparts under W-integration, we can compute explicitly the change in the expected lifetime utility of unmatched farmers caused by M-integration as
As our analysis of the distributional consequences of M-integration already anticipates, it will prove useful to separate the rest of our welfare analysis into two parts. First, we consider the case in which di¤erences in intermediation costs are the only di¤erence in market institutions across the two islands: < , but = . Second, we turn to the polar case in which intermediation costs are constant, = , but bargaining powers are not, < .
If Northern and Southern traders only di¤er in terms of their intermediation costs, equation
(44) and N > W immediately imply that V U F > 0 and M-integration necessarily increases social welfare in the Southern island. Intuitively, in this case M-integration essentially provides unmatched Southern farmers with access to a better intermediation technology, which increases the rate at which they meet traders and, in addition, improves their bargaining positions. By a¤ecting the threat point in their negotiations, M-integration also makes matched Southern farmers better o¤ and matched Southern traders worse o¤.
In the polar case in which Northern and Southern traders only di¤er in terms of their bargaining power, M-integration is equivalent to an increase in the bargaining power of unmatched traders from to . As equation (44) indicates, its e¤ect on aggregate welfare in the Southern island depends on two forces. On the one hand, a larger implies more entry and thus a higher probability of being matched for Southern farmers. On the other hand, once matched, Southern farmers have weaker bargaining power. In the Appendix, we show that social welfare is increasing in if and only if
, which in the search-theoretic literature on labor markets is referred to as Hosios'(1990a) condition. Hence, if ", the second force will dominate and by raising primitive traders' primitive bargaining power from to , M-integration will reduce aggregate welfare in the South. Note that aggregate losses in the Southern island are possible in spite of the fact that M-integration always induces output growth compared to W-integration.
What explains these results? The source of these potentially perverse welfare results is not rentshifting between the two islands. 27 If social welfare goes down in the South after M-integration, 2 6 Formally, equations (42) and (43) 
r . 2 7 A welfare analysis based on the comparison of steady states would wrongly suggest otherwise. In the new steady then social welfare goes down in the world as a whole. Instead, what is important here is that when ", the equilibrium in the Southern island under W-integration is ine¢ cient because it features a disproportionate entry of traders given the matching frictions. The key behind the ine¢ ciency is the trading externality underlying the search friction in goods markets. More speci…cally, the terms of exchange between a trader and a farmer not only a¤ect the division of surplus among these two agents, but also a¤ect the entry of traders and thus the probabilities for unmatched farmers and traders of …nding a match. Nevertheless, farmers and traders only bargain after they have found a match and thus their negotiations will fail to internalize this externality. M-integration only aggravates this problem because Northern traders have an even higher bargaining power, and thus social welfare is driven down. This result clearly echoes Bhagwati's (1971) Our main results about the impact of M-integration are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 M-integration: (i) always induces growth along the transition path and, if the matching elasticity " is nonincreasing in the level of intermediation, leads to convergence across islands; (ii) always creates winners and losers; and (iii) may decrease aggregate welfare.
Policy
In the previous two sections we studied the e¤ects of W-and M-integration and demonstrated the possibility of losses from trade for the South (and the world as a whole) under the latter type of state, it is true that matched Northern traders earn rents that used to accrue to Southern traders. But since there are no matched Northern traders at t0, such considerations are irrelevant for computing welfare changes at that date. economic integration. In this section, we study alternative ways to circumvent these losses and bring the equilibrium closer to the e¢ ciency frontier.
Price Controls
As explained above, the possibility of losses from trade is tightly related to the fact that the entry of Northern traders may aggravate the trading externality in the Southern island. In our basic model, there is a unique socially e¢ cient division of surplus between traders and farmers and it is associated with the parameter con…guration = "
When > ", the entry of Northern traders with a bargaining share > naturally pushes the equilibrium division of surplus further away from the socially e¢ cient one.
To …x ideas, suppose for now that the Southern government (or a worldwide social planner) is convinced that > > ". A …rst possible policy intervention in response to this ine¢ ciency is to directly regulate the terms of exchange between farmers and traders. For example, the Southern government may force Northern traders operating in South to buy co¤ee from farmers at a relative price no lower than p f = (1 ~ ) p W , where~ is implicitly given bỹ
with~ such that
This policy e¤ectively puts a cap on the margin charged by Northern traders. It is straightforward to check that the imposition of a price ‡oor p f would lead to an e¢ cient level of entry of Northern traders and to a level of intermediation in the South that is also socially e¢ cient. Hence, Mintegration accompanied by optimal price controls on foreign traders would necessarily increase aggregate welfare in the South whenever > ".
A few comments are in order. First, we have presupposed that the primitive bargaining power of farmers is ine¢ ciently low, i.e., > ". If instead we had < ", perhaps because the number of matches is very responsive to the measure of unmatched traders in the island, then our price ‡oors may be lower than the price that farmers would actually command in the absence of a price control. In such case, the price- ‡oor constraint would not be binding and an upper bound on the price of co¤ee might actually be the right welfare-enhancing policy! Second, the previous policy intervention assumes that the Southern government is able to discriminate between Northern and Southern traders, which may go against, for example, the WTO's national treatment principle. If the Southern government had to force Southern traders to buy co¤ee at the same price as Northern traders, then matched Southern traders may decide to exit right away after M-integration, which may well reduce welfare in the South on that account (see Appendix).
Third, getting the price ‡oor right may, of course, be very di¢ cult in practice. For the previous scheme to work, the Southern government needs to know, among other things, the shape of the matching function (and, in particular, its elasticity "), the world relative demand for co¤ee ( ), and the intermediation costs of Northern traders, . Although this seems highly unrealistic, our analysis suggests a fairly simple way to implement optimal price control. Since the terms of trade of Southern traders, S , is a su¢ cient statistic for welfare analysis, the rule of thumb for the Southern government should be to pick the minimum price p f paid by Northern traders in a way that minimizes the value S . In other words, the only variable that the Southern government may need to observe in practice to engineer a welfare-enhancing price control is the Southern traders' margins. For this mechanism to work, however, it is again important that the Southern government is allowed to impose the price control only on Northern traders. This feature of our model constitutes an important point of departure from the standard policy recommendations implied by models of trade in the presence of domestic distortions (c.f., Bhagwati, 1971) . In particular, the optimal tackling of the ine¢ ciency causing the (potentially) perverse welfare e¤ects from trade requires a policy that actively discriminates against foreign economic agents. 28 Finally, note that the previous policy does more than prevent welfare losses from M-integration, it maximizes social welfare in the South conditional on (Southern) production technologies and 
Tax Instruments
In this environment, price controls are not the only way to achieve social e¢ ciency or rule out the possibility of losses from trade integration. In particular, tax instruments may be used to achieve the same goal. Suppose, for example, that the Southern government were to impose a tax (or subsidy) on all unmatched traders …nding a match in a given period, with the amount being transferred to the farmer involved in such a match. Under such a policy, the value functions of 2 8 An informationally lighter alternative to governmental price control is fostering the creation of farmers'cooperatives which would bind all farmers to sell their co¤ee to traders at some pre-speci…ed price (in analogy to Pissarides', 1986 , model of unions in a search-theoretic model of the labor market). For e¢ ciency to be achieved, however, one can show that the farmers'cooperative should also be able to discriminate between Northern and Southern traders by o¤ering these traders di¤erent prices (details available upon request).
2 9 To see this, consider the situation in which the restriction on Northern traders'margins is binding: N = W . By equations (32) and (33), we know that
where c is the level of intermediation under this constraint. This is the same expression as under W-integration except that the cost of intermediation is instead of . Since < , we can conclude that c > W , which is su¢ cient for unmatched Southern farmers to be better o¤ than under W-integration.
unmatched Northern traders and unmatched Southern farmers would now satisfy
where is the intermediation level under this tax regime. It is straightforward to verify that if the tax is set to a level such that
then the economy will attain social e¢ ciency, just as with the price control. Note that when > ", there is over entry and so the optimal policy requires taxing unmatched traders. The converse is true for < ".
Compared to a price control, taxing or subsidizing entry has one important advantage. It does not require the Southern government to discriminate between Northern and Southern traders since, after M-integration, all unmatched traders active in the Southern island will be from the North.
This also implies this tax/subsidy scheme will never generate ine¢ cient separations of Southern matches. In all other respects, optimal tax policy and optimal price control raise similar issues.
In principle, setting the right optimal tax/subsidy level requires detailed information about the several parameters of the model. Nevertheless, observing the e¤ect on the margins charged by Southern traders may serve as a useful guide in choosing taxes, as the welfare-maximizing level of also minimizes the value of the share S .
Market Design
In our model, farmers randomly meet traders from both islands. In this situation, we have shown that M-integration may lead to aggregate welfare losses. We now discuss how changes in the structure of matching markets (if feasible) may alleviate the risk of such losses.
Suppose that the government of the Southern island can create two segmented matching markets. Formally, it can force Southern and Northern traders to search for farmers in the Eastern and the Western part of the island, respectively. Suppose, in addition, that this information can be made common knowledge. In such an environment, if farmers could freely locate their farms in either part of the island, should we still expect aggregate losses from M-integration?
In order to answer this question, we need to be more precise about the timing of the game and our equilibrium concept. Consider, for example, the following game. At the time of M-integration, unmatched farmers simultaneously and individually choose (once and for all) on which side of the island they want to search. Then, after observing farmers'decisions, unmatched traders from both islands decide whether or not they want to search in the Southern island. It is clear that such a game has multiple Nash equilibria, depending on which side of the island Southern farmers coordinate.
If all farmers coordinate on the Eastern part of the island, then only Southern traders will enter.
But the converse would be true if farmers were to coordinate on the Western part of the island, thereby leaving open the possibility of aggregate losses from M-integration.
Of course, the previous multiplicity of equilibria comes from the fact that a trader who enters an empty part of the island does not expect any farmer to start searching for him, although it may be optimal for some of these farmers to do so. With this in mind, a natural way to deal with this multiplicity of equilibria is to adopt a "subgame perfect" re…nement as in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) . Formally, suppose that at the time of M-integration, unmatched farmers and traders simultaneously decide where and whether to search, respectively. Now de…ne an equilibrium with "directed search" as a situation in which: (i) unmatched farmers search in the part of the island that maximizes their expected lifetime utility; (ii) unmatched traders active in one part of the island make zero expected pro…ts; (iii) inactive unmatched traders expect the rate at which they …nd farmers in an empty part of the island (if any) to be such that farmers are indi¤erent between searching in both parts of the island; and (iv) conditional on these expectations, inactive unmatched traders make non-positive expected pro…ts. It is easy to check that an equilibrium with directed search may only feature the entry of Northern traders if they increase aggregate welfare in the Southern island. The basic argument is simple. If there was an equilibrium with aggregate losses from M-integration because of the entry of Northern traders, then Southern traders would expect to meet farmers on their part on the island at a rate higher than under W-integration (because V U F is decreasing in T ), which would contradict the fact that their expected pro…ts are non-positive.
To summarize, introducing segmented matching markets (and providing information about these markets) is likely to circumvent aggregate losses from M-integration. In our …rst example, the possibility of aggregate losses from trade hinges on a coordination failure: unmatched farmers are coordinating on a Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium. In our second example, our "subgame perfect"re…nement guarantees that aggregate losses can no longer arise: Northern traders will enter the Southern island if and only if they increase aggregate welfare in the South.
Although the results in this section are admittedly quite stylized, we believe that they resonate well with some of the issues raised by activists who emphasize the fact that farmers in developing countries tend to be "marginalized" and that this fact is important in explaining the low prices received for their products. In this section, we have shown that providing farmers from the South with better trading opportunities and better information about these opportunities may be su¢ cient to help farmers solve their prisoner's dilemma and avoid losses from deeper trade integration. More generally, one would expect any reform that allows farmers to direct their search towards particular traders, whether they are from the islands or not, to be welfare-enhancing. 30 Of course, in the context of a developing economy, if implementing such reforms requires building new roads and investing in other infrastructure, it is likely to be very costly as well.
Proposition 4 summarizes the main results of our analysis about policy interventions. In this paper, we have provided answers to these questions. First, we have shown that di¤erent types of integration interact with the entry of intermediaries in distinct ways. While intermediaries always magnify the gains from trade under the integration of Walrasian markets (that is, when economic integration leads to the convergence of goods prices across countries), their presence can also be associated with a country -and the world as a whole -incurring welfare losses under the integration of matching markets (that is, when economic integration leads to the entry of foreign intermediaries in local markets). Second, we have used our theoretical framework to illustrate, among other things, that price controls and tax policy imposed on foreign traders might be welfareenhancing when implemented in a way that minimizes the margins charged by local traders.
Our model of intermediation in trade is special along several dimensions, but our approach of using dynamic bargaining and matching techniques to model international transactions can be explored and pursued in several fruitful directions. For instance, we have focused on a situation in which only one intermediary separates farmers from centralized markets. It would be interesting to extend our framework to allow for multiple layers of intermediation, perhaps by introducing search frictions between local traders and foreign ones. If materializing the gains from Walrasian market integration requires the use of additional layers of intermediation, then it becomes less obvious that this type of integration will always produce magni…ed gains from trade.
Another important feature of our framework is that there is a large number of traders whose rents are dissipated through free entry. Although this may be a valid description of itinerant traders in certain agricultural markets in Africa, there exist situations in practice in which trade is intermediated by a relatively small number of trading companies, each controlling a signi…cant market share. In a short companion note (Antràs and Costinot, 2010) , we have studied a variant of our framework in which farmers and traders are in …xed supply and each trader obtains some positive rents in equilibrium. The qualitative results obtained in that alternative environment are analogous to those derived here. In particular, the integration of Walrasian markets generates Pareto welfare gains, while the integration of matching markets has the potential to lead to aggregate welfare losses. 31 The key behind those potentially harmful welfare e¤ects is, however, distinct from the search externality emphasized in this paper, and is instead more closely related to standard rent-shifting e¤ects in models with imperfectly competitive markets. Another potentially fruitful way to study the role of market concentration in our environment would be to allow traders to form coalitions of endogenous size among themselves.
Throughout our paper we have also assumed that farmers are risk neutral and homogeneous.
As argued before, assuming that farmers are risk averse would help microfound our assumption on the existence of cross-country variation in primitive bargaining power. Besides this, risk aversion could also complement some of our results in interesting ways. For instance, one could endogenize the specialization decision of an individual farmer (instead of simply assuming it, as we have done in our model) and study how the decision to grow co¤ee, sugar, or both interacts with search frictions and risk aversion. In that respect, our predicted increase in intermediation following trade integration could encourage farmers to specialize their crops according to comparative advantage, thereby producing additional gains from trade. As a …nal note, we could also introduce variation across farmers in their productivity, geographical location or wealth (if traders also provide credit) and use our framework to derive cross-sectional predictions regarding the use of intermediaries, the margins that they charge, and their consequences for inequality.
3 1 The same qualitative results can also be shown to hold in an environment with a …xed number of traders and a perfectly elastic supply of farmers due, perhaps, to their choice between subsistence and market production.
A Proofs
Section 3.3. In the main text we have illustrated the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium by construction, but we have omitted a few derivations, which we develop below.
Claim 1: At any point in time, the solution of the Nash bargaining problem satis…es equations (5)-(7).
Let
N denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the Nash bargaining problem. Using equations
(1)- (4), it is clear that the …rst-order conditions associated with Nash bargaining are:
as well as constraint (7). From these equations, we immediately obtain (6), which ensures by concavity and homogeneity of degree one that
Plugging these equalities in the …rst-order conditions we …nally obtain equation (5). QED.
Claim 2: At any point in time, satis…es equation (17).
Since v is homogeneous of degree one, we know that
Combining the two previous expressions with equations (1)-(4), we obtain
Since equation (5) holds at all points in time, we also know that
Multiplying equation (A1) by and equation (A2) by (1 ) and subtracting, we get
Equation (17) derives from the previous expression and equations (10) and (18). QED.
Claim 3: At any point in time, is the unique solution of equation (20), i.e.,
It is immediate that ( ) is continuous and strictly increasing in . We next note that lim !0 T ( ) = +1 and lim !+1 F ( ) = +1 imply lim !0 ( ) = 0 and lim !+1 ( ) = +1. 
We need to show that 0 ( ) > 0. Di¤erentiating ( ), we obtain
where the inequality follows from
Section 4.3. In the main text we have argued that if the elasticity " ( ) d ln m (u F ; u T )/ d ln u T is nonincreasing in the level of intermediation, , then, ceteris paribus, islands with lower levels of intermediation will grow faster after W-integration. We now establish this result formally.
Let us denote by N A the steady state number of matched farmer-trader pairs in the South under autarky.
Since the relative price of co¤ee is p = a C =a S , real GDP in the South under autarky, Y A , is given by 
The two previous equations imply that the growth rate in real GDP between the autarky and W-integration steady states, Y W =Y A , is proportional to the growth rate in the number of matches, N W =N A . In order to establish that W-integration leads to convergence, we therefore need to show that N W =N A is decreasing in .
To do so, we denote by N (v) the number of matches in equilibrium when the utility associated with a matched farmer trader pair is equal to v in the South. With these notations, we have 
which can be rearranged as
Using equation (20), it is easy to check that
Since " ( ) and T ( ) are non-increasing in and F ( ) is increasing in , equation (A5) implies that @ ln / @ ln v is decreasing in . Combining this observation with equation (A4), we obtain that @ ln N / @ ln v is decreasing in .
Finally, note that if the matching function is CES, m (u F ; u T )
which is non-increasing in for 2 are greater than their autarky levels, and , at any point in time; and: (ii) the value functions of all agents are also greater than their autarky levels at any point in time. We now demonstrate these two results formally.
Without loss of generality, we focus on the Southern island. We assume that W-integration occurs at some date t 0 . For notational convenience, we still denote by p W and W the world price and the intermediation level, respectively, but it should be clear that they now are functions of t. Our proof proceeds in four steps.
Step 1: For all t t 0 , the indirect utility of a matched farmer-trader pair in the South satis…es
This directly derives from the fact that, like in a standard Ricardian model, a change in the relative price of co¤ee necessarily expands the "budget set" of a farmer-trader match.
Step 2: For all t t 0 , the intermediation level in the South satis…es
By the same argument as in Section 3.3, the value function of matched traders in the South under W-integration must satisfy V W (t) ! 1, which cannot be an equilibrium.
Step 3: All traders are necessarily better o¤ under W-integration.
For unmatched traders, this directly derives from free entry. For matched traders, this derives from equation (18) and the fact that T W T ( ) by Step 2.
Step 4: All farmers are necessarily better o¤ under W-integration.
The Bellman equations associated with the farmers'value functions are still given by equations (1) and (2). Using equation (17), they can be rearranged as (10) and (18), we obtain
By
Step 2, we know that 
rV
By equation (A9), (t) 2 (0; 1) also requires that
Otherwise, Southern farmers would never accept matches with (at least) one type of traders, say those from island i. This would imply i = 0, and so, that traders form island i would be better o¤ staying in their hammocks by equations (A11) and (A13). Combining equation (A15) and (A12), we obtain h r + + T
Similarly, combining equations (A10) and (A16), we get 
By equations (A9) and (A10), we also know that
where we have used the fact that if Southern traders search at date t, we must have max V Step 3: For almost all t > t 0 , we must have (t) = 1.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exist t 1 < t 2 such that an arbitrary trader from the Southern island is active in the Southern island for all t 2 (t 1 ; t 2 ). By de…nition, we know that By equation (29), we know that social welfare is given by
Since u F (t) is predetermined at date t and v p W is independent of , this implies
where Z (t) u F (t) +
[N F u F (t)] r+ > 0. By equations (20), and (21), we know that
Di¤erentiating the previous expression, we obtain
By directly di¤erentiating equation (20), it is easy to check that
where (r + ) (1 ") + (1 ) F ( ) > 0 since is increasing in . Combining equations (A27) and (A28), we obtain @V U F (t) @ = r 2 (r + ) (" ) (r + ) (1 ") + (1 ) F ( ) .
Equations (A26) and (A29) imply that W (t) is increasing in if and only if ". QED Section 6.1. In the main text, we have argued that nondiscriminatory price control may lead to ine¢ cient separations in the Southern island. We now demonstrate this result formally. Under price control, we know that~ and~ satisfy~ = "
(1 ") ~ 1
If price control is nondiscriminatory, we have S =~ . In this situation, Southern traders will separate from their matched farmers whenever~ v p W < . By equation (A30), this is equivalent to
Such a separation will be ine¢ cient if
Using equation (A31), it is easy to check that (1 ")
~ . Hence, there
exist parameter values such that nondiscriminatory price control may lead to ine¢ cient separations in the Southern island. QED.
